The Solvinity case: First time the Netherlands blocks a US acquisition
Updated: Nov 4
On October 13, 2026, Dutch State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Climate Willemijn Aerdts informed Parliament that she had upheld her decision of May 25, 2026 to block Kyndryl's acquisition of Solvinity, on the ground that it could threaten the public interest. Kyndryl has already walked away from the deal. Solvinity and its majority shareholder can still appeal to the Rotterdam District Court within six weeks.
This is the first time the Dutch screening authority has blocked a U.S. transaction. It is not the first time an EU Member State has done so: France blocked Teledyne's acquisition of Photonis in 2020, and Flowserve's acquisition of the Canadian valve maker Velan in 2023 because of Velan's French subsidiaries. It is, however, the first time a U.S. acquisition has been blocked on the ground that U.S. law itself creates the risk.
This blog post sets out what was at stake, unpacks the legal test the State Secretary applied, and explains why the decision matters.
I. What was at stake
Solvinity is a private company, majority-owned since 2014 by the UK private equity firm Vitruvian Partners, through Host Lux, alongside three Dutch holding companies (Judgment of the Rotterdam District Court of 14 July 2026, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2026:8586 ("Judgment"), para. 15). Kyndryl, a U.S.-listed IT infrastructure company, intended to acquire all of its shares through its Dutch subsidiary (Judgment, paras. 16–17).
Solvinity hosts and manages data and IT systems for a wide range of government clients. Its best-known client relationship is DigiD, the national digital identity platform that citizens use to access medical, pension, insurance and tax services. It also hosts MijnOverheid, the portal through which citizens interact with the government, and Digipoort, the government's central electronic gateway. DigiD itself remains government property, managed by the government agency Logius. Solvinity runs and manages it technically.
Its other clients include the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Dutch police, several other ministries and agencies, the City of Amsterdam and Translink, which operates the OV-chipkaart. Large Dutch financial institutions are also clients, and its subsidiary Securify provides cybersecurity services to government bodies and banks.
This client base is what made the deal sensitive. According to the State Secretary, the nature of its services and its role as manager of data and IT systems give Solvinity deep access to government information, including special categories of personal data, sensitive information from the criminal justice chain, and financial data on Dutch citizens and companies (Judgment, para. 14).
II. The legal test
Neither the prohibition nor the decision on the objection has been published, and the letters to Parliament say little about the reasoning. The best window into it is an interim ruling.
After the May prohibition, Solvinity and Host Lux filed an objection with the State Secretary. In parallel, they asked the Rotterdam District Court to suspend the prohibition so that the deal could close in the meantime. The court refused on July 14, finding virtually no urgency (Judgment, paras. 34–38). In doing so, it summarised the State Secretary's reasoning in detail, with access to the full, unredacted file (Judgment, paras. 4–5, 10, 14–27). That reasoning follows three steps.
1. Does the transaction fall within the screening regime?
The transaction was screened under the Act on Undesirable Control in Telecommunications (Wet ongewenste zeggenschap telecommunicatie, WOZT), now Chapter 14a of the Telecommunications Act. This sector-specific regime follows the same logic as the general investment screening mechanism under the Vifo Act. It applies to anyone who intends to acquire predominant control in a telecommunications party, regardless of the acquirer's nationality.
The State Secretary found that Solvinity qualifies as a telecommunications party under Article 14a.2(1), because it provides an electronic communications service and a data centre service. By acquiring all of Solvinity's shares, Kyndryl would obtain predominant control resulting in "relevant influence" within the meaning of Article 14a.4(3) (Judgment, para. 18).
2. Could the acquisition threaten the public interest?
Relevant influence alone is not enough. A threat to the public interest also requires one of the circumstances relating to the acquirer listed in Article 14a.4(2). One of those circumstances is that the acquirer has close ties to, or is under the influence of, a foreign state, or that there are grounds to suspect such ties (Judgment, para. 19).
The State Secretary found that this applied to Kyndryl, not because of anything Kyndryl had done, but because it is a U.S. company. She pointed to several U.S. laws with extraterritorial effect (Judgment, para. 21):
the CLOUD Act
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), in particular Section 702
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires communications companies to make their systems accessible for interception
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which can give U.S. authorities access to stored data, even outside the U.S.
She considered these risks to be real rather than hypothetical. She referred to the 2013 SCA warrant in which the U.S. Department of Justice ordered Microsoft to hand over emails stored on a server in Ireland. Microsoft initially refused, because the data was stored outside the U.S. After the CLOUD Act was adopted in 2018, providers were required to disclose data within their "possession, custody, or control", wherever it is stored, and in the State Secretary's words Microsoft had to comply after all (United States v. Microsoft Corp., dismissed as moot in 2018). The same could happen to Kyndryl, since control under the CLOUD Act extends to data held by a European subsidiary (Judgment, para. 22).
She added that such requests usually come with a non-disclosure order, require no involvement of a Dutch court, and are difficult to challenge in U.S. courts (Judgment, para. 23).
On that basis, she concluded that Kyndryl falls within Article 14a.4(2)(b). Kyndryl is subject to U.S. law and must comply with it. It has limited ability to resist a subpoena, and it is often barred from informing the persons whose data is requested. Covert access to the sensitive personal data held by Solvinity would amount to misuse of the telecommunications party. Securify's position with "top Dutch government and institutional Banks" further aggravated the risk (Judgment, para. 24).
The court accepted this assessment, at least provisionally. It held that the State Secretary was competent to impose the prohibition and that the threat was sufficiently substantiated. Even if the risk is limited in practice, she could reasonably regard it as unacceptable given the potential impact (Judgment, paras. 39–48).
3. Could the risk be mitigated short of a prohibition?
Under Article 14a.4(1), the starting point is that a prohibition is imposed only if the threat cannot be removed through suspensive conditions. The State Secretary tested the heaviest condition available: placing all Solvinity shares in a foundation (a stichting administratiekantoor, or STAK), so that Kyndryl would hold only depositary receipts without voting rights (Judgment, para. 25).
She rejected this option. Kyndryl would remain the economic owner, Solvinity would remain financially dependent on it, and she could not dictate the foundation's articles and administration conditions in full. Because the heaviest condition fell short, she saw no need to examine lighter ones (Judgment, para. 26). She also rejected Solvinity's proposal to carve out its government business into a separate entity held by an independent foundation. In her view, the unbundling would be complex and possibly destructive, and would leave an entity that would not be viable in the long term (Judgment, para. 27).
This is the one point on which the court pushed back. It could not prescribe the content of the decision on the objection (Judgment, para. 48). It nevertheless indicated that the State Secretary would have to address whether a lighter measure was possible. As an example, it mentioned fully encrypting the data Solvinity has access to, so that Solvinity itself cannot read it, with the key held outside its reach (Judgment, para. 49). The decision on the objection of October 13 maintained the prohibition. The letter to Parliament says only that all relevant facts were analysed again and additional research was carried out.
III. Why the decision is significant
This is the first outright prohibition since the Dutch Investment Screening Bureau (BTI) began operations in 2020. The BTI received 69 notifications in 2024 and 78 in 2025, and imposed no prohibitions in 2025. The only earlier prohibition, from 2024, was disclosed only anonymously in the BTI's annual report and was converted into a conditional approval after objection.
The decision shows that the Netherlands is prepared to use its screening tools against U.S. investors, even at the cost of friction with Washington. The U.S. Embassy said it was "disappointed by the Dutch government's decision". It argued that more dialogue could have produced a solution, and called for clear, fair and reciprocal rules that attract U.S. investment.
Yet Washington has partly caused this friction itself, through laws with such far-reaching extraterritorial effect. The problem was not Kyndryl but the legal reach of its home state. Once Kyndryl owned Solvinity, U.S. authorities could require Kyndryl's American parent to obtain Solvinity's data, including DigiD-related, criminal justice and financial data, often under a gag order and with little room to challenge the request.
This also explains why the corporate remedy failed and why the court pointed to a technical one. A STAK changes who controls the company, but it does not change who can reach the data: as long as Kyndryl remains the economic owner, U.S. law arguably still reaches Solvinity. Encryption with a key outside Solvinity's reach addresses the risk at its source. Even a valid U.S. order would then produce only unreadable data.
For U.S. investors in European digital infrastructure, the lesson is clear. A mitigation package will have to address the reach of U.S. law, not only questions of governance.




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